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Abstract
This paper axiomatically studies bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility
by focusing on generalizations of consistency and the contested garment principle.
On the one hand, we discuss several consistency notions and introduce the class of
parametric bankruptcy rules which contains the proportional rule, the constrained
relative equal awards rule, and the constrained relative equal losses rule. On the other
hand, we introduce the class of adjusted bankruptcy rules and characterize the relative
adjustment principle by truncation invariance, minimal rights first, and a weak form
of relative symmetry.
Keywords NTU-bankruptcy problems · Consistency · Relative adjustment principle ·
Parametric bankruptcy rules · Adjusted bankruptcy rules
JEL Classification C79 · D63 · D74
1 Introduction
A bankruptcy problem with nontransferable utility, shortly an NTU-bankruptcy prob-
lem, arises when claimants have individual and incomparable claims on a set of
attainable utility allocations. Bankruptcy rules assign to each such a bankruptcy
problem a feasible utility allocation. NTU-bankruptcy problems form a natural gener-
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alization of TU-bankruptcy problems where the assumption of linear and transferable
utility is dropped.TU-bankruptcyproblems arewell-studied in the literature (cf. Thom-
son 2003, 2013, 2015) and the question arises whether and how bankruptcy theory
can be extended to NTU-bankruptcy problems. However, this passage is in general
fraught with difficulties.
Orshan et al. (2003), and Dietzenbacher (2018), Estévez-Fernández et al. (2019)
studied NTU-bankruptcy problems from a game theoretic perspective by defining an
appropriate coalitional bankruptcy game and focusing on the structure of the core.
Instead, we continue on the axiomatic approach of Dietzenbacher et al. (2016) by
formulating some appropriate properties for bankruptcy rules and studying their impli-
cations.
Dietzenbacher et al. (2016) explored proportionality, equality, and duality in the
context of NTU-bankruptcy problems and introduced the proportional rule, the con-
strained relative equal awards rule, and the constrained relative equal losses rule.
They extended axiomatic characterizations by adequately generalizing the correspond-
ing properties for TU-bankruptcy rules to NTU-bankruptcy rules. In particular, they
defined the relative symmetry property which imposes a relatively equal treatment
of claimants with relatively equal claims, i.e. equal claims in relation to their utopia
values. Moreover, they defined the property of truncation invariance, which imposes
invariance of the prescribed allocation under truncation of the claims by the utopia
values.
For bankruptcy problems with transferable utility, the proportional rule, the con-
strained equal awards rule, and the constrained equal losses rule can be considered as
the three basic bankruptcy rules. Herrero and Villar (2001) called these bankruptcy
rules the three musketeers. Another well-studied rule for bankruptcy problems with
transferable utility, which according to Herrero and Villar (2001) plays the role of
D’Artagnan, is the so-called Talmud rule. Aumann and Maschler (1985) showed that
the Talmud rule is the unique TU-bankruptcy rule satisfying consistency and the con-
tested garment principle. This paper offers a first, careful attempt to generalize these
two concepts to bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility on which a gener-
alized Talmud rule can be based in future research.
Following Thomson (2011), the consistency principle can be stated as follows.
Consider a bankruptcy problem and the corresponding payoff allocation assigned
by a particular bankruptcy rule. Suppose that some claimants leave with their allo-
cated payoffs and that the remaining claimants reevaluate their allocated payoffs. The
bankruptcy rule is called consistent if it prescribes for this reduced problem the same
payoffs for the involved claimants. The design of these reduced problems for NTU-
bankruptcy problems is however not straightforward, and different modeling choices
have different consequences.
We examine the relation of the proportional rule, the constrained relative equal
awards rule, and the constrained relative equal losses rule with several consistency
notions. The proportional rule satisfies a multilateral consistency notion which con-
verts reduced problems into new bankruptcy problems for the remaining claimants.
This result can be used to derive new axiomatic characterizations using an elevator
lemma. The constrained relative equal awards rule and the constrained relative equal
losses rule do not satisfy multilateral consistency, but they do satisfy consistency
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on a restricted domain which includes NTU-bankruptcy problems induced by TU-
bankruptcy problems. Inspired by Young (1987), we introduce a class of parametric
bankruptcy rules which contains the three basic bankruptcy rules, and we show that all
parametric bankruptcy rules satisfy a consistency notion which interprets the reduced
problem as the original bankruptcy problem where the leaving claimants leave a foot-
print behind. Future research could further explore this footprint consistency notion
and the class of parametric bankruptcy rules.
The contested garment principle for TU-bankruptcy rules describes a standard solu-
tion for bankruptcy problems with two claimants where they first concede the minimal
rights to each other and subsequently divide the remaining estate equally. To ade-
quately generalize this two-claimant solution to the relative adjustment principle for
NTU-bankruptcy rules, we study minimal rights in NTU-bankruptcy problems. The
minimal rights first property requires that first allocating minimal rights, the maximal
individual payoffs within the estate when all other claimants are allocated their claims,
and subsequently applying the bankruptcy rule to the remaining bankruptcy problem,
leads to the same payoff allocation as direct application of the bankruptcy rule to the
original bankruptcy problem.
The three basic bankruptcy rules do not satisfy minimal rights first. Inspired by
Thomson and Yeh (2008), we introduce the truncation operator and minimal rights
operator which ‘force’ bankruptcy rules to satisfy truncation invariance and mini-
mal rights first, respectively. The new bankruptcy rules obtained by applying both
operators to existing ones form the class of adjusted bankruptcy rules. All adjusted
counterparts of bankruptcy rules which satisfy relative symmetry coincide on the
class of bankruptcy problems with two claimants. The corresponding two-claimant
NTU-bankruptcy rule is called the relative adjustment principle which generalizes
the contested garment principle for TU-bankruptcy problems. The new principle is
characterized by truncation invariance, minimal rights first, and a restricted form of
relative symmetry.
This paper is organized in the following way. In Sect. 2, we provide an overview
of NTU-bankruptcy theory. Section 3 discusses several consistency notions and intro-
duces the class of parametric bankruptcy rules. Section 4 introduces the class of
adjusted bankruptcy rules and studies the relative adjustment principle.
2 Preliminaries
Let N be a nonempty and finite set of claimants. The collection of all subsets of N is
denoted by 2N = {S | S ⊆ N }. For any x, y ∈ RN , x ≤ y denotes xi ≤ yi for all
i ∈ N , and x < y denotes xi < yi for all i ∈ N . For any set of payoff allocations
E ⊆ RN+ ,
– the comprehensive hull is given by comp(E) = {x ∈ RN+ | ∃y∈E : y ≥ x};
– the weak upper contour set is given by WUC(E) = {x ∈ RN+ | ¬∃y∈E : y > x};
– the weak Pareto set is given by WP(E) = {x ∈ E | ¬∃y∈E : y > x};
– the strong Pareto set is given by SP(E) = {x ∈ E | ¬∃y∈E,y =x : y ≥ x}.
Note that SP(E) ⊆ WP(E) ⊆ WUC(E). A set of payoff allocations E ⊆ RN+ is
called comprehensive if E = comp(E), and nonleveled if SP(E) = WP(E).
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A bankruptcy problem with nontransferable utility (cf. Orshan et al. 2003) is a
triple (N , E, c) in which E ⊆ RN+ is a nonempty, closed, bounded, comprehensive,
and nonleveled estate, and c ∈ WUC(E) is a vector of claims.1 Let BRN denote
the class of all bankruptcy problems with claimant set N . For convenience, an NTU-
bankruptcy problem is denoted by (E, c) ∈ BRN .
Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . The vector of utopia values uE ∈ RN+ is given by
uE = (max{xi | x ∈ E})i∈N .
The vector of truncated claims ĉE ∈ RN+ is given by
ĉE =
(
min{ci , uEi }
)
i∈N .
Note that (E, ĉE ) ∈ BRN .
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in
which E = {x ∈ RN+ | x21 + 2x2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 24). We have uE = (6, 18) and
ĉE = (3, 18). This is illustrated as follows.
E
c







A bankruptcy rule f on BRN assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN a payoff allocation
f (E, c) ∈ WP(E) for which f (E, c) ≤ c. A bankruptcy rule f on BRN satisfies
– relative symmetry if fi (E, c)uEj = f j (E, c)uEi for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and any
i, j ∈ N with ci uEj = c j uEi ;
– truncation invariance if f (E, c) = f (E, ĉE ) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN .
The proportional rule Prop on BRN (cf. Dietzenbacher et al. 2016) assigns to any
(E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
Prop(E, c) = λE,cc,
where λE,c ∈ [0, 1] is such that Prop(E, c) ∈ WP(E). The proportional rule satisfies
relative symmetry, but does not satisfy truncation invariance.
1 Alternatively, one can interpret a bankruptcy problemwith nontransferable utility as a bargaining problem
with claims (cf. Chun and Thomson 1992) where the disagreement point equals the zero vector, or as a
Nash rationing problem (cf. Mariotti and Villar 2005) where the admissible allocations are nonnegative.
Contrary to these models, we allow for a nonconvex estate and claims which exceed the maximal individual
payoffs within the estate.
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The constrained relative equal awards ruleCREA onBRN (cf. Dietzenbacher et al.
2016) assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
CREA(E, c) =
(
min{ci , αE,cuEi }
)
i∈N ,
where αE,c ∈ [0, 1] is such that CREA(E, c) ∈ WP(E). The constrained relative
equal awards rule satisfies both relative symmetry and truncation invariance.
The constrained relative equal losses rule CREL on BRN (cf. Dietzenbacher et al.
2016) assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN with E = {0N } the payoff allocation
CREL(E, c) =
(
max{0, ci − βE,cuEi }
)
i∈N ,
where βE,c ∈ R+ is such that CREL(E, c) ∈ WP(E). The constrained relative equal
losses rule satisfies relative symmetry, but does not satisfy truncation invariance.
Example 2 Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in
which E = {x ∈ RN+ | x21 + 2x2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 24) as in Example 1. We have
λE,c = 23 , αE,c = 34 , and βE,c = 1 − 16
√
15. This means that Prop(E, c) = (2, 16),
CREA(E, c) = (3, 1312 ), and CREL(E, c) = (
√














Consistency requires that application of a bankruptcy rule to a reduced problem leads to
the same payoffs for the involved claimants as within the original bankruptcy problem.
For TU-bankruptcy problems, the estate of such a reduced problem can simply be
defined as the original estate subtracted with the allocated payoffs to the leaving
claimants (cf.AumannandMaschler 1985). ForNTU-bankruptcyproblems, the design
of such a reduced problem is not straightforward.Wediscuss severalways to generalize
the consistency property for TU-bankruptcy rules.
A natural option is to convert the reduced problem into a new bankruptcy problem
for the remaining claimants in which the estate is defined as the part of the original
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estate where all leaving claimants are allocated their corresponding payoffs. For this,
we need to extend the domain of bankruptcy rules to bankruptcy problems for any





S∈2N \{∅} BRS . A bankruptcy rule f on BR
N
assigns to any
(E, c) ∈ BRS with S ∈ 2N\{∅} a payoff allocation f (E, c) ∈ WP(E) for which
f (E, c) ≤ c.
Let (E, c) ∈ BRN , let x ∈ RN+ , and let S ∈ 2N\{∅}. The set of payoff allocations
ExS ⊆ RS+ is defined by
ExS =
{
y ∈ RS+ | (y, xN\S) ∈ E
}
.
Note that (E f (E,c)S , cS) ∈ BRS for any bankruptcy rule f on BRN .
A bankruptcy rule is multilaterally consistent if it assigns to each reduced prob-
lem the same payoffs for the remaining claimants as within the original bankruptcy
problem.
Definition 3.1 (Multilateral consistency) A bankruptcy rule f on BRN satisfies mul-
tilateral consistency if fS(E, c) = f (E f (E,c)S , cS) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and any
S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
The weaker property which only considers reduced problems for two remaining
claimants is called bilateral consistency.
Definition 3.2 (Bilateral consistency) A bankruptcy rule f on BRN satisfies bilateral
consistency if fS(E, c) = f (E f (E,c)S , cS) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and any S ∈ 2N with|S| = 2.
In other words, a bankruptcy rule is bilaterally consistent if it assigns to each two-
claimant reduced problem the same payoffs for the remaining claimants as within the
original bankruptcy problem. This principle can also be applied in reverse direction.
Consider any bankruptcy problem and a corresponding feasible payoff allocation.
Suppose that for each two-claimant reduced problem a bankruptcy rule prescribes the
corresponding payoffs within this allocation. Then the rule is called conversely consis-
tent (cf. Thomson 2011) if it assigns this payoff allocation to the original bankruptcy
problem.
Definition 3.3 (Converse consistency) A bankruptcy rule f on BRN satisfies converse
consistency if f (E, c) = x for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and any x ∈ WP(E) with x ≤ c for
which xS = f (ExS , cS) for all S ∈ 2N with |S| = 2.
If a bilateral consistent rule coincides with a conversely consistent rule on the class
of two-claimant bankruptcy problems, then the rules coincide for any bankruptcy
problem. This type of result is known as an elevator lemma (cf. Thomson 2011).
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Lemma 3.1 (Elevator Lemma) Let f and g be two bankruptcy rules on BRN . If f
satisfies bilateral consistency, g satisfies converse consistency, and f (E, c) = g(E, c)
for all (E, c) ∈ BRS with S ∈ 2N and |S| = 2, then f = g.
Proof Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let x = f (E, c). Since f satisfies bilateral consistency,
we have xS = f (ExS , cS) for all S ∈ 2N with |S| = 2. This means that xS = g(ExS , cS)
for all S ∈ 2N with |S| = 2. Since g satisfies converse consistency, this implies that
g(E, c) = x . Hence, f (E, c) = g(E, c). 
For a bankruptcy rule which satisfies both bilateral consistency and converse con-
sistency, the Elevator Lemma can be used to extend axiomatic characterizations from
bankruptcy problems with two claimants to problems with any number of claimants.
An example of such a bankruptcy rule is the proportional rule.
Lemma 3.2 The proportional rule satisfies multilateral consistency.
Proof Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let S ∈ 2N\{∅}. We have PropS(E, c) = λE,ccS and
Prop(EProp(E,c)S , cS) = λE
Prop(E,c)
S ,cS cS,
where λE,c ∈ [0, 1] is such that Prop(E, c) ∈ WP(E) and λEProp(E,c)S ,cS ∈ [0, 1] is
such that
Prop(EProp(E,c)S , cS) ∈ WP(EProp(E,c)S ).
Since PropS(E, c)∈EProp(E,c)S , we have PropS(E, c)≤Prop(EProp(E,c)S , cS). Since E
is nonleveled and
(
Prop(EProp(E,c)S , cS),PropN\S(E, c)
)
∈ E,
this means that PropS(E, c) = Prop(EProp(E,c)S , cS). Hence, the proportional rule
satisfies multilateral consistency. 
Lemma 3.3 The proportional rule satisfies converse consistency.
Proof Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let x ∈ WP(E) with x ≤ c be such that xS =
Prop(ExS , cS) for all S ∈ 2N with |S| = 2. We have Prop(E, c) = λE,cc. More-
over, we have xS = λExS ,cS cS for all S ∈ 2N with |S| = 2, which means that x = tc
for some t ∈ [0, 1]. Since E is nonleveled, this means that Prop(E, c) = x . Hence,
the proportional rule satisfies converse consistency. 
Theorem 3.4 Anyaxiomatic characterizationof the proportional rule for two-claimant
bankruptcy problems yields an axiomatic characterization of the proportional rule for
bankruptcy problemswith any number of claimants if bilateral consistency or converse
consistency is required in addition.2
2 This type of theorem can be formulated for any bankruptcy rule satisfying bilateral consistency and
converse consistency.
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Proof We know from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 that the proportional rule satisfies bilateral
consistency and converse consistency. Let f be a bankruptcy rule on BR
N
satisfying
the properties in the axiomatic characterization of the proportional rule on the class of
two-claimant bankruptcy problems, and bilateral consistency or converse consistency.
Then we have f (E, c) = Prop(E, c) for all (E, c) ∈ BRS with S ∈ 2N and |S| = 2.
Since the proportional rule satisfies bilateral consistency and converse consistency,
we know from Lemma 3.1 that f = Prop. 
In particular, we can derive new characterizations of the proportional rule from the
work ofDietzenbacher et al. (2016) using Theorem3.4, by requiring the corresponding
properties in the axiomatic characterizations for the class of two-claimant bankruptcy
problems and adding bilateral or converse consistency.
Contrary to the class of TU-bankruptcy problems, the constrained relative equal
awards rule and the constrained relative equal losses rule do not satisfy multilateral
consistency on the class of NTU-bankruptcy problems. This is shown by the following
example.
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in
which E = {x ∈ RN+ | x21 + 2x2 + x23 ≤ 4} and c = (2, 2, 2). We have uE = (2, 2, 2)
and
Prop(E, c) = CREA(E, c) = CREL(E, c) = (1, 1, 1).
This means that
EProp(E,c){1,2} = ECREA(E,c){1,2} = ECREL(E,c){1,2} =
{




Prop(EProp(E,c){1,2} , c{1,2}) = (1, 1, ·) ,









5 − 34 , ·
)
,













3−3−√3+ 54 , ·
)
.
Hence, the constrained relative equal awards rule and the constrained relative equal
losses rule do not satisfy multilateral consistency.
However, we have
EProp(E,c){1,3} = ECREA(E,c){1,3} = ECREL(E,c){1,3}
=
{
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which implies that
Prop(EProp(E,c){1,3} , c{1,3}) = CREA(ECREA(E,c){1,3} , c{1,3})
= CREL(ECREL(E,c){1,3} , c{1,3})
= (1, ·, 1) . 
In Example 3, the constrained relative equal awards rule and the constrained relative
equal losses rule do satisfy consistency on the domain of reduced problems for which
the ratio of utopia values is equal to the ratio of utopia values in the original problem.
This holds in general. We introduce the restricted consistency property to describe this
type of bankruptcy rules.3
Definition 3.4 (Restricted consistency) A bankruptcy rule f on BRN satisfies
restricted consistency if fS(E, c) = f (E f (E,c)S , cS) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and any
S ∈ 2N\{∅} for which uE f (E,c)S = tuES for some t ∈ [0, 1].
Note that both multilateral consistency and restricted consistency generalize the
consistency notion for TU-bankruptcy rules.
Proposition 3.5 The constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies restricted con-
sistency.
Proof Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let S ∈ 2N\{∅} be such that uECREA(E,c)S = tuES for some
t ∈ [0, 1]. We have CREAi (E, c) = min{ci , αE,cuEi } for all i ∈ S and





= (min{ci , tαE
CREA(E,c)
S ,cS uEi })i∈S,
where αE,c ∈ [0, 1] is such that CREA(E, c) ∈ WP(E) and αECREA(E,c)S ,cS ∈ [0, 1] is
such that
CREA(ECREA(E,c)S , cS) ∈ WP(ECREA(E,c)S ).
SinceCREAS(E, c) ∈ ECREA(E,c)S ,wehaveCREAS(E, c)≤CREAS(ECREA(E,c)S , cS).
Since E is nonleveled and
(
CREA(ECREA(E,c)S , cS),CREAN\S(E, c)
)
∈ E,
this means that CREAS(E, c) = CREA(ECREA(E,c)S , cS). Hence, the constrained
relative equal awards rule satisfies restricted consistency. 
Proposition 3.6 The constrained relative equal losses rule satisfies restricted consis-
tency.
3 Peters et al. (1994) introduced a similar property for bargaining solutions.
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Proof Let (E, c) ∈ BRN with E = {0N } and let S ∈ 2N\{∅} be such that uECREL(E,c)S =
tuES for some t ∈ [0, 1]. We have CRELi (E, c) = max{0, ci − βE,cuEi } for all i ∈ S
and





= (max{0, ci − tβE
CREL(E,c)
S ,cS uEi })i∈S,
where βE,c ∈ R+ is such that CREL(E, c) ∈ WP(E) and βECREL(E,c)S ,cS ∈ R+ is such
that
CREL(ECREL(E,c)S , cS) ∈ WP(ECREL(E,c)S ).
SinceCRELS(E, c) ∈ ECREL(E,c)S ,wehaveCRELS(E, c)≤ CRELS(ECREL(E,c)S , cS).
Since E is nonleveled and
(
CREL(ECREL(E,c)S , cS),CRELN\S(E, c)
)
∈ E,
this means that CRELS(E, c) = CREL(ECREL(E,c)S , cS). Hence, the constrained rel-
ative equal losses rule satisfies restricted consistency. 
Converting reduced problems induced by leaving claimants into new bankruptcy
problems for the remaining claimants tends to lose characteristics of the original
problems. In particular, significant information on the interrelations of the remaining
claimants is lost by the projection operation. Instead, the reduced problem could also
be interpreted as the original bankruptcy problem where the payoffs of the leaving
claimants have already been determined. In a sense, the leaving claimants leave a
footprint behind on the original bankruptcy problem. To formalize this approach, we
redefine bankruptcy rules assigning to any footprint bankruptcy problem an allocation
for which the payoffs of the remaining claimants are bounded by their claims, and the
leaving claimants are assigned their footprints.
A footprint bankruptcy problem is a quintuple (N , E, c, x, S)where (E, c) ∈ BRN
is a bankruptcy problem, x ∈ RN+ is a vector of footprints, and S ∈ 2N\{∅} is a set
of remaining claimants for which (ExS , cS) ∈ BRS . Let FBRN denote the class of
all footprint bankruptcy problems with claimant set N . For convenience, a footprint
bankruptcy problem is denoted by (E, c, x, S) ∈ FBRN and (E, c, x, N ) ∈ FBRN is
abbreviated to (E, c) ∈ FBRN .
A bankruptcy rule f on FBRN assigns to any footprint bankruptcy problem
(E, c, x, S) ∈ FBRN a payoff allocation f (E, c, x, S) ∈ WP(E) for which
fS(E, c, x, S) ≤ cS and fN\S(E, c, x, S) = xN\S .
Note that (E, c, f (E, c), S) ∈ FBRN for all (E, c) ∈ BRN , any S ∈ 2N\{∅}, and any
bankruptcy rule f on FBRN .
123
NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative… 111
The proportional rule Prop on FBRN assigns to any (E, c, x, S) ∈ FBRN the payoff
allocation for which
PropS(E, c, x, S) = λE,c,x,ScS,
where λE,c,x,S ∈ [0, 1] is such that Prop(E, c, x, S) ∈ WP(E).
The constrained relative equal awards rule CREA on FBRN assigns to any
(E, c, x, S) ∈ FBRN the payoff allocation for which
CREAS(E, c, x, S) =
(
min{ci , αE,c,x,SuEi }
)
i∈S ,
where αE,c,x,S ∈ [0, 1] is such that CREA(E, c, x, S) ∈ WP(E).
The constrained relative equal losses rule CREL on FBRN assigns to any
(E, c, x, S) ∈ FBRN with E = {0N } the payoff allocation for which
CRELS(E, c, x, S) =
(
max{0, ci − βE,c,x,SuEi }
)
i∈S ,
where βE,c,x,S ∈ R+ is such that CREL(E, c, x, S) ∈ WP(E).
We now introduce the footprint consistency property to describe bankruptcy rules
which prescribe the same payoff allocation for the original bankruptcy problem as for
any footprint bankruptcy problem in which the footprints equal the allocated payoffs.
Definition 3.5 (Footprint consistency). A bankruptcy rule f on FBRN satisfies foot-
print consistency if f (E, c) = f (E, c, f (E, c), S) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and any
S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
Inspired by Young (1987), we introduce the class of parametric bankruptcy rules
where the payoff allocated to a claimant only depends on individual characteristics
within the bankruptcy problemand a commonparameter. It turns out that all parametric
bankruptcy rules satisfy footprint consistency.
Definition 3.6 (Parametric bankruptcy rule) A bankruptcy rule f on FBRN is para-
metric if there exists a function r f : R3+ → R+, monotonic in its third argument,
for which fS(E, c, x, S) = (r f (ci , uEi , θ E,c,x,S))i∈S for all (E, c, x, S) ∈ FBRN and
some parameter θ E,c,x,S ∈ R+.
Theorem 3.7 All parametric bankruptcy rules satisfy footprint consistency.
Proof Let f be a parametric bankruptcy rule on FBRN , let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let S ∈
2N\{∅}. Then, we have fN\S(E, c) = fN\S(E, c, f (E, c), S). Moreover, we have
fi (E, c) = r f (ci , uEi , θ E,c) and fi (E, c, f (E, c), S) = r f (ci , uEi , θ E,c, f (E,c),S) for
all i ∈ S. Since r f is monotonic in its third argument, this means that fS(E, c) ≤
fS(E, c, f (E, c), S) or fS(E, c) ≥ fS(E, c, f (E, c), S). Since E is nonleveled, this
implies that f (E, c) = f (E, c, f (E, c), S). Hence, f satisfies footprint consistency.
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Specific examples of parametric bankruptcy rules are the proportional rule, the
constrained relative equal awards rule, and the constrained relative equal losses rule.
Corollary 3.8 The proportional rule, the constrained relative equal awards rule, and
the constrained relative equal losses rule satisfy footprint consistency.
Example 4 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in
which E = {x ∈ RN+ | x21 + 2x2 + x23 ≤ 4} and c = (2, 2, 2) as in Example 3. We
have
Prop{1,2}(E, c,Prop(E, c), {1, 2}) = CREA{1,2}(E, c,CREA(E, c), {1, 2})
= CREL{1,2}(E, c,CREL(E, c), {1, 2})
= (1, 1, ·). 
Future research could further explore footprint consistency and the class of para-
metric bankruptcy rules.
4 The relative adjustment principle
The contested garment principle for TU-bankruptcy rules (cf. Aumann and Maschler
1985) describes a standard solution for bankruptcy problemswith two claimants where
they first concede theminimal rights to each other, and subsequently divide the remain-
ing estate equally. To adequately generalize this two-claimant solution to the relative
adjustment principle for NTU-bankruptcy rules, we first studyminimal rights in NTU-
bankruptcy problems.
The minimal right of a claimant in a TU-bankruptcy problem is defined as the
remaining part of the estate when all other claimants are allocated their claims (cf.
Curiel et al. 1987). Following Estévez-Fernández et al. (2019), we define the minimal
right of a claimant in an NTU-bankruptcy problem as the maximal individual payoff
within the estate when all other claimants are allocated their claims.
Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . The vector of minimal rights m(E, c) ∈ RN+ is, for all i ∈ N ,
defined by
mi (E, c) =
{
max{x | (x, cN\{i}) ∈ E} if (0, cN\{i}) ∈ E;
0 if (0, cN\{i}) /∈ E.
We have m(E, c) ∈ E and m(E, c) ≤ c, which means that
((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c)) ∈ BRN .
Moreover, we have m(E, c) ≤ f (E, c) ≤ ĉE for any bankruptcy rule f on BRN .
Example 5 Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in
which E = {x ∈ RN+ | x21 + 2x2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 24) as in Example 1. We have
m(E, c) = (0, 1312 ). This is illustrated as follows.
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E
c








The following lemma derives some elementary relations between truncated claims
and minimal rights.
Lemma 4.1 Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then
(i) ̂̂cE E = ĉE ;
(ii) m((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c)) = 0N ;
(iii) m(E, ĉE ) = m(E, c);
(iv) c-m(E,c)
∧(E−{m(E,c)})+ = ĉE − m(E, c).
Proof (i) Let i ∈ N . Then
̂̂cEi
E = min{ĉEi , uEi } = min{min{ci , uEi }, uEi }
= min{ci , uEi } = ĉEi .
(i i) Let i ∈ N . Suppose that mi ((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c)) > 0. Then
(
mi ((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c)), (c − m(E, c))N\{i}
) ∈ (E − {m(E, c)})+.
This means that
(
mi ((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c)) + mi (E, c), cN\{i}
) ∈ E .
This contradicts the definition of mi (E, c).
(i i i) Let i ∈ N . If ĉEN\{i} = cN\{i}, then mi (E, ĉE ) = mi (E, c). If ĉEN\{i} = cN\{i},
then (0, cN\{i}) /∈ E , so mi (E, ĉE ) = 0 = mi (E, c).






ci − mi (E, c), u(E−{m(E,c)})+i
}
= min{ci − mi (E, c), uEi − mi (E, c)}
= min{ci , uEi } − mi (E, c)
= ĉEi − mi (E, c).
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Suppose that there exists a j ∈ N\{i} for which m j (E, c) > 0. Then ĉEi = ci and
(m j (E, c), cN\{ j}) ∈ E . Since E is comprehensive and m(E, c) ≤ c, this means that
(ci ,mN\{i}(E, c)) ∈ E , so (ci −mi (E, c), 0N\{i}) ∈ (E − {m(E, c)})+. This implies






ci − mi (E, c), u(E−{m(E,c)})+i
}
= ci − mi (E, c)
= ĉEi − mi (E, c).

The minimal rights first property requires that first allocating minimal rights and
subsequently applying the bankruptcy rule to the remaining problem leads to the same
payoff allocation as direct application of the bankruptcy rule to the original problem.
Definition 4.1 (Minimal rights first) A bankruptcy rule f on BRN satisfies minimal
rights first if
f (E, c) = m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c))
for all (E, c) ∈ BRN .
The following example shows that the proportional rule, the constrained relative
equal awards rule, and the constrained relative equal losses rule do not satisfy minimal
rights first.
Example 6 Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in
which E = {x ∈ RN+ | x21 + 2x2 ≤ 36} and c = (5, 15). We have uE = (6, 18)
and m(E, c) = (√6, 512 ). Let f be a bankruptcy rule on BRN satisfying relative
symmetry, e.g. the proportional rule, the constrained relative equal awards rule, or the
constrained relative equal losses rule. Then
f (E, c) = m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c)).
This is illustrated as follows.
E
c
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Since the constrained relative equal awards rule and the constrained relative equal
losses rule are dual bankruptcy rules (cf.Dietzenbacher et al. 2016), and the constrained
relative equal awards rule satisfies truncation invariance, thismeans thatminimal rights
first and truncation invariance are not dual properties, in contrast to the TU-bankruptcy
context (cf. Herrero and Villar 2001).
Inspired by Thomson and Yeh (2008), we introduce two operators which ‘force’
bankruptcy rules to satisfy truncation invariance andminimal rights first. LetF denote
the space of all bankruptcy rules onBRN . The truncation operator T : F → F assigns
to any bankruptcy rule f ∈ F the bankruptcy rule T ( f ) ∈ F which assigns to any
(E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
T ( f )(E, c) = f (E, ĉE ).
The minimal rights operator M : F → F assigns to any bankruptcy rule f ∈ F the
bankruptcy ruleM( f ) ∈ F which assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
M( f )(E, c) = m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c)).
Note that both operators are well-defined. We have f = T ( f ) if and only if f ∈ F
satisfies truncation invariance, and f = M( f ) if and only if f ∈ F satisfies minimal
rights first. In particular, this means that CREA = T (CREA).
The next theorem studies some consequences of the truncation operator and the
minimal rights operator for the properties of the bankruptcy rules to which they are
applied.
Theorem 4.2 Let f ∈ F be a bankruptcy rule.
(i) Then T ( f ) satisfies truncation invariance.
(ii) Then M( f ) satisfies minimal rights first.
(iii) If f satisfies relative symmetry, then T ( f ) satisfies relative symmetry.
(iv) If f satisfies truncation invariance, thenM( f ) satisfies truncation invariance.
(v) If f satisfies minimal rights first, then T ( f ) satisfies minimal rights first.
Proof (i) Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then
T ( f )(E, ĉE ) = f (E, ̂̂cE E ) = f (E, ĉE ) = T ( f )(E, c),
where the second equality follows from Lemma 4.1(i).
(i i) Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then
m(E, c) + M( f )((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c))
= m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c))
= M( f )(E, c),
where the first equality follows from Lemma 4.1(ii).
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(i i i)Assume that f satisfies relative symmetry. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let i, j ∈ N
be such that ci uEj = c j uEi . Then
ĉEi u
E
j = min{ci , uEi }uEj = min{ciuEj , uEi uEj } = min{c j uEi , uEj uEi }
= min{c j , uEj }uEi = ĉEj uEi .
Since f satisfies relative symmetry, this means that
T ( f )i (E, c)uEj = fi (E, ĉE )uEj = f j (E, ĉE )uEi = T ( f ) j (E, c)uEi .
(iv) Assume that f satisfies truncation invariance. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then
M( f )(E, ĉE ) = m(E, ĉE ) + f ((E − {m(E, ĉE )})+, ĉE − m(E, ĉE ))
= m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE − m(E, c))
= m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, (c−m(E, c))
∧
(E−{m(E,c)})+)
= m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c))
= M( f )(E, c),
where the second equality follows from Lemma 4.1(i i i), the third equality follows
from Lemma 4.1(iv), and the fourth equality follows from f satisfying truncation
invariance.
(v) Assume that f satisfies minimal rights first. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then
m(E, c) + T ( f )((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c))
= m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, (c−m(E, c))
∧
(E−{m(E,c)})+)
= m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE − m(E, c))
= m(E, ĉE ) + f ((E − {m(E, ĉE )})+, ĉE − m(E, ĉE ))
= f (E, ĉE )
= T ( f )(E, c),
where the second equality follows fromLemma4.1(iv), the third equality follows from
Lemma 4.1(i i i), and the fourth equality follows from f satisfyingminimal rights first.

The purpose of Theorem 4.2 is twofold. First, it shows that the truncation operator
and the minimal rights operator indeed ‘force’ bankruptcy rules to satisfy truncation
invariance and minimal rights first, respectively. Second, it studies the preservation
of properties under the truncation operator and the minimal rights operator. Both
operators preserve truncation invariance and minimal rights first. Relative symmetry
is preserved under the truncation operator, but Example 6 shows that it is not preserved
under the minimal rights operator.
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Let f ∈ F . From Theorem 4.2 we know that T ( f ) satisfies truncation invariance
and M( f ) satisfies minimal rights first, which means that
T (T ( f )) = T ( f ) and M(M( f )) = M( f ).
By the preservation of properties, T (M( f )) and M(T ( f )) both satisfy truncation
invariance and minimal rights first, which means that
T (M(T ( f ))) = T (M(M( f ))) = T (M( f ))
andM(T (T ( f ))) = M(T (M( f ))) = M(T ( f )).
Hence, nothing changeswhen one of the operators is appliedmore than once.However,
the two operators can be combined to obtain a bankruptcy rule which satisfies both
truncation invariance and minimal rights first. The following proposition shows that
the order in which the operators are applied does not matter.
Proposition 4.3 Let f ∈ F . Then T (M( f )) = M(T ( f )).
Proof Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . We can write
T (M( f ))(E, c) = M( f )(E, ĉE )
= m(E, ĉE ) + f ((E − {m(E, ĉE )})+, ĉE − m(E, ĉE ))
= m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE − m(E, c))
= m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, (c−m(E, c))
∧
(E−{m(E,c)})+)
= m(E, c) + T ( f )((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c))
= M(T ( f ))(E, c),
where the third equality follows from Lemma 4.1(i i i) and the fourth equality follows
from Lemma 4.1(iv). 
The bankruptcy ruleT (M( f )) is called the adjusted counterpart of the rule f ∈ F .
Three examples of adjusted bankruptcy rules are givenby the adjusted proportional rule
T (M(Prop)),4 the adjusted constrained relative equal awards rule T (M(CREA)),
and the adjusted constrained relative equal losses rule T (M(CREL)). On the class
of bankruptcy problems with two claimants, these three adjusted bankruptcy rules
coincide. This standard solution for two-claimant bankruptcy problems is called the
relative adjustment principle.5
Definition 4.2 (Relative adjustment principle) The relative adjustment principle RAP
on BRN with |N | = 2 assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN with |N | = 2 the payoff allocation
RAP(E, c) = m(E, c) + ρE,c
(
ĉE − m(E, c)
)
,
4 The adjusted proportional rule for TU-bankruptcy problems was introduced by Curiel et al. (1987). In the
context of bargaining problems with claims (cf. Chun and Thomson 1992), a similar adjusted proportional
rule was introduced by Herrero (1997).
5 For TU-bankruptcy problems, Aumann and Maschler (1985) called this standard solution the contested
garment principle. Later, Thomson (2003) named it the concede-and-divide principle.
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where ρE,c ∈ [0, 1] is such that RAP(E, c) ∈ WP(E).6
Example 7 Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in
which E = {x ∈ RN+ | x21 + 2x2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 24) as in Example 1 and Example
5. We have ĉE = (3, 18) and m(E, c) = (0, 1312 ). This means that RAP(E, c) =
( 32
√
5 − 112 , 94
√
5 + 1114 ). This is illustrated as follows.
E
c









In order to axiomatically study the relative adjustment principle, we introduce the
class of simple bankruptcy problems.
Definition 4.3 (Simple bankruptcy problem) A bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN is
called simple if ĉE = c and m(E, c) = 0N .
Let SBRN denote the class of all simple bankruptcy problems with claimant set N .
Lemma 4.4 Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then ((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE − m(E, c)) ∈ SBRN .
Proof We can write




= ĉE −m(E, c),
where the first equality follows from Lemma 4.1(i i i), the second equality follows
from Lemma 4.1(iv), and the third equality follows from Lemma 4.1(i) and Lemma
4.1(i i i). Moreover, we can write
m((E−{m(E, c)})+, ĉE−m(E, c))=m((E − {m(E, ĉE )})+, ĉE − m(E, ĉE ))=0N ,
where the first equality follows from Lemma 4.1(i i i) and the second equality follows
from Lemma 4.1(ii). 
6 For an arbitrary number of claimants, this formula corresponds to the adjusted proportional rule.
123
NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative… 119
A bankruptcy rule satisfies the simple counterpart of a property if it satisfies that
property on the class of simple bankruptcy problems. For instance, a bankruptcy rule
f ∈ F satisfies simple relative symmetry if fi (E, c)uEj = f j (E, c)uEi for all (E, c) ∈
SBRN and any i, j ∈ N with ciuEj = c j uEi . Note that all bankruptcy rules satisfy
simple truncation invariance and simple minimal rights first.
If a bankruptcy rule satisfies a property, then Lemma 4.4 implies that its adjusted
counterpart satisfies the simple counterpart of that property. For instance, the adjusted
counterpart of any relatively symmetric bankruptcy rule satisfies simple relative sym-
metry. Inspired byDagan (1996),we axiomatically characterize the relative adjustment
principle by simple relative symmetry, truncation invariance, and minimal rights first.
In particular, this means that the adjusted counterpart of any relatively symmet-
ric bankruptcy rule coincides with the relative adjustment principle on the class of
bankruptcy problems with two claimants.
Theorem 4.5 The relative adjustment principle is the unique two-claimant bankruptcy
rule satisfying simple relative symmetry, truncation invariance, and minimal rights
first.
Proof First, we show that the relative adjustment principle satisfies simple relative
symmetry, truncation invariance, and minimal rights first. Let (E, c) ∈ SBRN with






mi (E, c) + ρE,c
(




= ρE,cc j uEi
=
(
m j (E, c) + ρE,c
(
ĉEj − m j (E, c)
))
uEi
= RAP j (E, c)uEi .
Hence, RAP satisfies simple relative symmetry. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN with |N | = 2. We
can write
RAP(E, ĉE ) = m(E, ĉE ) + ρE,ĉE
(̂̂cE E − m(E, ĉE )
)
= m(E, c) + ρE,ĉE
(
ĉE − m(E, c)
)
,
where the second equality follows from Lemmas 4.1(i) and 4.1(i i i). Since E is non-
leveled, this means that RAP(E, c) = RAP(E, ĉE ). Hence, RAP satisfies truncation
invariance.
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Let (E, c) ∈ BRN with |N | = 2. We can write
m(E, c) + RAP((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c))






= m(E, c) + ρ(E−{m(E,c)})+,c−m(E,c)
(
ĉE − m(E, c)
)
,
where the first equality follows from Lemma 4.1(ii) and the second equality follows
from Lemma 4.1(iv). Since E is nonleveled, this means that
RAP(E, c) = m(E, c) + RAP((E − {m(E, c)})+, c − m(E, c)).
Hence, RAP satisfies minimal rights first.
Second, we show that there is a unique two-claimant bankruptcy rule satisfying
simple relative symmetry, truncation invariance, and minimal rights first. Let f be a
bankruptcy rule on BRN with |N | = 2 satisfying simple relative symmetry, truncation
invariance, and minimal rights first. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN with |N | = 2. Since f satisfies
truncation invariance and minimal rights first, we have
f (E, c) = m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE − m(E, c)).
We know from Lemma 4.4 that ((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE − m(E, c)) ∈ SBRN . Let
i ∈ N and let j ∈ N\{i}. We can write
u(E−{m(E,c)})+i = max{xi | x ∈ (E − {m(E, c)})+}
= max{xi | (xi + mi (E, c),m j (E, c)) ∈ E}
=
{
uEi − mi (E, c) if m j (E, c) = 0;
ci − mi (E, c) if m j (E, c) > 0
=
{
uEi − mi (E, c) if ĉEi = uEi ;
ci − mi (E, c) if ĉEi = ci
= ĉEi − mi (E, c).
This means that
(




ĉEj − m j (E, c)
)
u(E−{m(E,c)})+i .
Since f satisfies simple relative symmetry, this implies that
f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE − m(E, c)) = t
(
ĉE − m(E, c)
)
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for some t ∈ [0, 1]. We can write
f (E, c) = m(E, c) + f ((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE − m(E, c))
= m(E, c) + t
(
ĉE − m(E, c)
)
.
Since E is nonleveled, this means that
f (E, c) = m(E, c) + ρE,c
(
ĉE − m(E, c)
)
.
Hence, f = RAP. 
Future research could study other characterizations of the relative adjustment prin-
ciple inspired by results for the contested garment principle based on self-duality
(cf. Dagan 1996), securement (cf. Moreno-Ternero and Villar 2004), and lower/upper
securement (cf. Moreno-Ternero and Villar 2006).
Corollary 4.6 The adjusted proportional rule, the adjusted constrained relative equal
awards rule, and the adjusted constrained relative equal losses rule coincide with the
relative adjustment principle on the class of bankruptcy problems with two claimants.
Future research could study generalizations of other bankruptcy rules which coin-
cidewith the relative adjustment principle on the class of two-claimant TU-bankruptcy
problems, such as the random arrival rule (cf. O’Neill 1982), the minimal overlap rule
(cf. O’Neill (1982)), and the Talmud rule (cf. Aumann and Maschler 1985).
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